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University of Bergen 
 
Let me begin with two accounts by a witness to early twentieth-century colonial 
trauma: 
Some of the inhabitants of this place are scarcely human. Every male 
between the ages of 18 &55 in Ceylon is liable to a road tax of rs 1.50; if he 
does not pay by March 31st he is liable to a fine of rs 10 or in default a 
month’s imprisonment. At every place I stop, crowds of these defaulters are 
brought up to me by the headmen for trial & sentence. They bring down to 
me wild savages from the hills, spectacles incredible to anyone who has not 
seen them. Naked except for a foul rag round their loins, limbs which are 
mere bones, stomachs distended with enormously enlarged spleens, their 
features eaten away by & their skin covered with sores from one of the most 
loathsome of existing diseases called parangi, or else wild apelike creatures 
with masses of tangled hair falling over their shoulders their black bodies 
covered with white scales of parangi scab hobbling along on legs enormous 
from elephantitis. (Letters 140-41) 
 
I had to go (as Fiscal) to see four men hanged one morning. They were 
hanged two by two. I have a strong stomach but at best it is a horrible 
performance. I go to the cells & read over the warrants of execution & ask 
them whether they have anything to say. They nearly always say no. Then 
they are led out clothed in white, with curious white hats on their heads 
which at the last moment are drawn down to hide their faces. They are led 
up on to the scaffold & the ropes are placed around their necks. I have (in 
Kandy) to stand on a sort of verandah where I can actually see the man 
hanged. The signal has to be given by me. The first two were hanged all 
right but they gave one of the second too wide a drop or something went 
wrong. The man’s head was practically torn from his body & there was a 
great jet of blood which went up about 3 or 4 feet high, covering the gallows 
and priest who stands praying on the steps. The curious thing was that this 
man as he went to the gallows seemed to feel the rope round his neck: he 
kept twitching his head over into the exact position they hang in after death. 
Usually they are quite unmoved. One man kept repeating two words of a 
Sinhalese prayer (I think) over & over again all the way to the gallows & 
even as he stood with the rope round his neck waiting for the drop. (Letters 
133) 
 
Both these accounts were written by the Jewish writer and political commentator 
Leonard Woolf in letters home, the first to his friend Saxon Sidney-Turner in 1908; 
the second to Lytton Strachey in 1907. They record his work as a colonial 
administrator and magistrate between 1905 and 1911, in charge of judicial and 
punitive matters in the Jaffna, Kandy and Hambantota districts of Ceylon. They also 
register his abhorrence and disgust – with the “scarcely human” victim and with his 
own role as functionary and overseer in an inhuman and barely functioning colonial 
machine. As a Jew in the Civil Service Woolf was somewhat ambiguously placed in 
the colonial hierarchy of ethnicity and class, an ambiguity that was compounded 
further by his increasing ambivalence about the colonial enterprise and his own role 
within it. The letters he wrote during these years show Woolf staging himself 
alternately as observer and agent, witness and perpetrator, in a colonial life that, as 
Douglas Kerr has observed, unfolds as an endless series of degradations (Kerr 264). 
A more processed account appears in Growing (1961), the volume of Woolf’s 
autobiography that deals with his time in Ceylon, where the experience is recounted 
as deeply traumatic, but also formative of “Leonard Woolf” as a prominent figure in 
British interwar intellectual and political debate. In this narrative, widely accepted 
among Woolf biographers and scholars, Woolf’s early fiction, notably his 1913 
novel A Village in the Jungle, plays a central role. Writing the novel is generally 
thought of as the making of Leonard Woolf the anti-imperialist and left-wing 
thinker on international relations, providing the means and the space, as he put it 
himself, by which he could “vicariously live their [the villagers’] lives” (1964: 47). 
The transnational stance the novel opened up for certainly informs Woolf’s writing 
and political activism through the 1920s, as he established himself as a leading 
critic of empire whose analysis of global inequality and theories of international 
cooperation helped shape Labour Party policies as well as the development of the 
League of Nations. What is even more striking, as we shall see, is that the modes of 
thinking, the conceptual operations and tropes supplied by the colonial experience 
and put to work in the fiction, are re-found in various guises towards the end of the 
interwar period when Woolf establishes himself as an early and prescient critic of 
totalitarian ideologies and regimes. 
 The narrative I have sketched so far suggests that witnessing – the trauma of 
the complicit observer and reluctant yet efficient perpetrator – defines “Leonard 
Woolf” as a subject position in much of his writing and as an agent in interwar 
intellectual and political debate. What interests me in this narrative are the kinds of 
thinking and writing the experience of witnessing sets in motion: first how the 
colonial trauma is processed and mediated in the early fiction, opening up for a 
political and ethical stance; next how it returns in different shapes and tropes at a 
moment of crisis, with the rise of European totalitarianism during the 1930s. 
Beyond its historical moment this “work of the witness” as I see it also has a 
bearing on current scholarly debate, implications that I propose to trace through a 
reading of four texts: first, the anti-colonial novel The Village in the Jungle (1913) 
and the short story “Three Jews”, composed in the context of anti-foreign sentiment 
during World War I; next, the anti-Fascist pamphlets Quack, Quack (1935) and 
Barbarians at the Gate (1939). It should be noted that the writing I examine is not 
testimony: it belongs to the genres of realist fiction and the political pamphlet. What 
nonetheless makes it significant to a theory of witnessing is that it works by a series 
of transnational comparisons (analogies, translations and transpositions) that are 
held together and generate assent by the subject position of the witness: “this, which 
I witness now can only be understood by comparison to that, which I witnessed 
then”. Moreover, it offers a notion of entangled histories, held together by the 
memory and conceptual operations of the witness, which anticipates and helpfully 




For some time now, postcolonial and transnational perspectives have been brought 
to bear on the cultural and literary study of witness accounts, especially narratives 
that have traditionally been thought of as the unique testimony of particular ethnic 
or cultural groups. A case in point would be Michael Rothberg’s proposal for a new 
direction in cultural memory studies in his book Multidirectional Memory: 
Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (2009). Here the term 
“multidirectional memory” is introduced to counteract what he sees as a destructive 
“competition” of memories, designating a transnational mode of reading attentive to 
the global connections that may emerge among the testimonies of different minority 
and subaltern groups, with the potential to create new forms of solidarity and new 
visions of justice out of the specificities, echoes, and overlaps of different historical 
experiences (Rothberg 5). More generally, the approach Rothberg recommends is 
indicative of a renewed interest in comparative and relational thinking across the 
humanities in recent years; an understanding of comparison inflected by 
entanglement and spatial modes of analysis based on interrelations, networks and 
circulation, which has come to appear not only as the more methodologically sound 
but as the only ethically viable approach. In the field of historical studies, 
“entangled histories”, “histoire croisée”, “geteilte” or “verwobene Geschichte” 
have become key concepts, reflecting an interest in processes of mutual influencing 
across borders as well as in the global refractions of what was once seen as 
historically and geopolitically discrete events (Kocka 2003).  
Of course such alternative forms of comparison are not something new; a 
mode of thinking that begins with postcolonialism and the spatial turn. Michael 
Rothberg points to Hannah Arendt’s methodology in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951) as an early instance of multidirectional memory to the extent that it places 
the European situation in a global context and employs a form of comparison based 
on the Benjaminean constellation to break out of the frames of a teleological 
narrative and identify connections that might otherwise go unnoticed. This view of 
Arendt is reflected in other academic fields, for instance in globally oriented studies 
of European totalitarianism and genocide, where Arendt’s attempt to locate the rise 
of European totalitarianism within a global geography inclusive of colonial Africa 
and Asia is thought of as prefiguring contemporary transnational research into the 
mutually constitutive relationship between Europe and its colonies (Grosse 2006; 
King and Stone 2007: 70). 
I have mentioned Arendt’s example here because the reception of her work 
in recent examples of transnational criticism points up very clearly some of the 
difficulties involved in ethically viable forms of comparative thinking, and in the 
notion of entangled history, especially when that thinking is made in the context of 
extreme events, and takes the form of an urgent attempt — by the witness to these 
events — to identify their antecedents and origins. While Arendt’s argument 
concerning the connections between imperialism and totalitarianism is commended 
by many for its Benjamin-inspired constellations and its break with teleological 
historiography, it has also been criticised, by Michael Rothberg among others, for 
its moments of reversion into a frame of thought where Europe appears as the telos 
of a progressivist narrative and totalitarianism as a form of regression within the 
European space (Rothberg 2009: 33–65).  Rothberg’s criticism is interesting 
because it raises questions about the cognitive, heuristic, and ethical value of 
comparison within a diachronic framework; in narratives searching for causes and 
historical lines of connection. The difficulties involved in cross-temporal 
comparison may account for the synchronic, horizontal slant of current approaches 
to comparison; the network model that attends primarily to cross-spatial coordinates 
and whose claims with regard to historical connection and causality emphasise the 
fractured and the tentative.1 
Arendt was writing with great urgency in an attempt to account for extreme 
events, to think in a sustained manner about what she perceived as a descent into 
																																																								
1 Rita Felski and Susan Stanford Friedman make a similar point in their introduction to a NLH 
Special Issue on comparison (Felski and Friedman 2009). 
barbarianism. The following discussion will not be occupied with her work, but 
with that of a writer whom one may be allowed to think of as one of her precursors. 
Leonard Woolf’s writing in the 1930s is marked by a similar urgency and contains 
thoughts on the connections between imperialism and totalitarianism that anticipate 
Arendt’s. Where Arendt turns to the archives (notably Conrad’s Heart of Darkness) 
for her conceptions of colonialism, however, Woolf writes on the basis of his 
recollections as a servant and observer of colonial power, inspired by a genuine 
commitment to “reading histories of oppression in tandem rather than in isolation” 
(Ho 716); a comparative project, I argue, that is effectively enabled by his complex 
and contingent position as a witness. 
“To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it 
really was’”, writes Benjamin in “Theses on the Philosophy of History”: “It means 
to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” (Benjamin 255). 
In Benjamin’s critical method the memory that “flashes up” functions as the 
dialectical image that disrupts the continuum of history, a monad “in which is 
crystallized all the tensions of the past, present, future together, at a standstill 
[Stillstellung]” (Benjamin 262-263). Woolf’s historical project in the 1930s is less 
about disruption than about connections. When he seizes on memory at a time of 
crisis it is to establish chains of evidence, to dispel doubt, to furnish the reader with 
the facts necessary to adjudicate. Firstly, Woolf’s fiction sets up global connections 
among histories of oppression by means of a range of comparative operations that 
enable his subsequent thinking on imperialism and international justice. Next, his 
1930s historiography of totalitarianism develops the insights attained through the 
fiction, yoking together European anti-Semitism and imperialism in an entangled 
narrative that anticipates Hannah Arendt’s analysis by two decades, and yet, like 
hers, founders in moments of contradiction and slippage. Despite the points of 
similarity with Arendt, however, there are differences; things to learn about the 
work of the witness which I hope this turn to the archives will bring out. 
 
Anti-Semitism and Colonialism: The Village in the Jungle and “Three Jews” 
In July 1917, Virginia and Leonard Woolf announced the start of The Hogarth Press 
with Two Stories by Virginia and Leonard Woolf, illustrated with four woodcuts by 
Dora Carrington. Virginia’s story was “The Mark on the Wall”; Leonard’s story the 
much less technically sophisticated “Three Jews”, an ironic take on the figure of 
“the alien” in a national context of anti-foreign sentiment. Virginia’s biographer 
Hermione Lee calls “Three Jews” “a signpost pointing down a road [Leonard] 
would not take — as a fiction writer, a Jewish writer” (Lee 1999, 359). The story 
follows closely upon two novels written on his return from colonial service in 
Ceylon (1904–1911): The Wise Virgins (1915), which also examines what Janice 
Ho calls “the racially ambiguous status of Jews in the early twentieth century” (717) 
and The Village in the Jungle (1913), which draws upon anti-Semitic discourse to 
figure the colonial Other in the remote villages of Ceylon. One may wonder at 
Woolf’s decision to launch The Hogarth Press with a story about three Jews and at 
his preoccupation with the nature of Jewish identity on his return from Ceylon. On 
the other hand, it is not surprising that the colonial experience should sharpen his 
perceptions of what has been called “the transnational workings of raciology” 
(Gilroy 2000: 20). Writing The Village in the Jungle allowed Woolf to analyse and 
understand the oppressive consequences of imperialism and global capitalism for a 
community of people and especially for the most marginalised members of that 
community, the veddas and tamils. This was achieved by a novel whose narrative 
form enables close observation and imaginative sympathy with the victim. It also 
occurs by means of a transposition of discourses, where the indigenous population 
is figured through European anti-Semitic discourse and the outcast protagonist 
depicted by means of the image of the suffering Jew and the scapegoat. What 
ensues from these operations is a transnational narrative that influenced Woolf’s 
thinking on imperialism and international justice during the 1920s and on the events 
that led towards European totalitarianism in the 30s. 
  Set in the Hambantota district, the area that Woolf administered as an 
Assistant Government Agent during the last three years of his time in the country, 
the novel centres on life in a small village community of peasant-cultivators. The 
storyline shows how the chief protagonists, the hunter and cultivator Silindu and his 
family, fall victim to the plotting of the village headman Babehami and the debt-
collector Fernando, whose positions in the colonial order allow them to manipulate 
the economic and bureaucratic machinery for their own ends. Silindu and his two 
daughters, Hinnihami and Punchi Menika, are scorned by the village population as 
Tamils and veddas, minority populations that were traditionally treated as inferior 
— a position, the novel shows, that was rendered even more precarious under 
imperialism. While in tribal society the rights of the individual and his influence 
upon the powerful were safeguarded by public opinion, imperialism intervenes into 
this balance, producing an oppressive order that breeds persecution and 
scapegoating. Life in the village is ruled by a system of credit, debt, and 
exploitation instituted and sanctioned by colonial authority. The local headmen 
have been given the right to issue taxes and licences for cultivation of crops — the 
so-called chena permits — along with gun licences for hunting and other vital 
documents. Through the intrigue surrounding these permits, the reader comes to 
understand the chena economy with its oppressive cycle of poverty, debt and 
exploitation, which benefits the middlemen, the headmen and moneylenders. As the 
novel explains: 
 
The life of the village and of every man in it depended on the cultivation of 
chenas. A chena is merely a piece of jungle . . . The villagers owned no 
jungle themselves; it belonged to the Crown, and no one might fell a tree or 
clear a chena in it without a permit from the Government. It was through 
these permits that the headman had his hold upon the villagers. (27) 
 
With the reaping of the chenas came the settlement of debts. With their little 
greasy notebooks full of unintelligible letters and figures, [the 
moneylenders] descended upon the chenas; and after calculations, 
wranglings and abuse, which lasted for hour after hour, the accounts were 
settled, and the strangers left the village. … In the end the villagers carried 
but little grain from his chena to his hut. (26) 
 
The novel is not written in the form of testimony by an individual eyewitness. 
Instead, an unnamed narrative voice occupies perspectives from within and outside 
the colonised community. Douglass Kerr describes the omniscient narrative as 
Woolf’s “compensatory fantasy” – compensating for the limited perspective and 
comprehension of the colonial administrator (Kerr 270). I choose to see the choice 
of narration as central to the novel’s imaginative and analytical thinking. The 
omniscient narrative serves to put the reader in the position of adjudicator, placing 
the facts before her, while generating assent through the veracity and detail 
associated with the eyewitness account. Here the narrative draws on Woolf’s 
extensive knowledge of the region, amassed through experience and observation in 
his capacity as administrator, adjudicator and magistrate, and on his studies of the 
languages and customs of the different ethnic and religious groups. The novel 
incorporates indigenous beliefs, customs and tales, as well as oral forms and modes 
of address that imitate the local Sinhalese idiom (Gooneratne 2004; Goonetilleke 
2007). Woolf’s fluency in the Tamil and Sinhalese languages far exceeded the 
requirements of colonial administration, and he took great pride in his extensive 
knowledge of local history and culture. In the novel, transliterated Sinhalese words 
and other local linguistic features indicate a stance of embeddedness and interiority. 
Almost every sentence contains a Sinhalese word; local terms for plants, crops, 
implements and methods of cultivation, animals, diseases, time, space and distance, 
family relationships, religious beliefs, social roles and functions — all are rendered 
in the local language. New words are explained in approximate terms in footnotes 
and become part of the novel’s vocabulary. The footnotes evoke the authority and 
veracity of ethnographic writing; the mediation of the informed observer. The result 
is a form of linguistic density, a thick representation, which constructs a world as 
far as possible from within.  
 The narrative technique also allows Woolf to stage his own role as 
sympathetic yet complicit observer. The plot against Silindu results in two court 
cases and one pre-trial examination during which the magistrate takes down 
Silindu’s confession of murder. What is really on trial, as it turns out, is 
colonialism. The narrative consciousness occupies different minds, puts before the 
reader the perspectives of the judge – the role Woolf had himself taken in numerous 
court cases – and the accused. Moving between different perspectives, the 
omniscient narration exposes the limits and failures of colonialism through the 
failures of its legal system, and articulates the truth that slips away from the 
language and proceedings of the law. The elaborate set-up of Western law is 
described in detail: the lay-out of the room, the actors with their different roles and 
the carefully scripted, ritualised proceedings – all of which are intended to secure an 
orderly and fair trial. But the charge is a fabrication, the evidence given incomplete 
and partly untrue. Throughout, communication is obstructed by mistranslation and 
misunderstanding. The accused do not understand the charges brought against them, 
and the judge, the white Hamadoru with his “impassive face” and “cat’s eyes” 
frightens them (119). Not much is said of the judge, except in glimpses caught by 
Babun and Silindu. At one point during the trial against Babun, however, with the 
narrative focalised via the judge, his doubt in the legal system is beginning to 
become apparent: “There was a curious look of pain in [Babun’s] face. The judge 
watched him in silence for some minutes, then he told the interpreter to call 
Silindu” (124). Called as a witness for the defense, Silindu fails to understand his 
role. He does not know what it means to testify in court. The judge’s attempts at 
cross-examination produce only more confusion rather than the evidence that would 
clear Babun of suspicion. Finally, the case is over and the judge reads out his 
verdict 
in a casual indifferent voice, as if in some way it had nothing to do with him: 
‘There is almost certainly something behind this case which has not come 
out. There is, I feel, some ill-feeling between complainant and accused. The 
complainant impressed me most unfavourably. But, the facts have to be 
considered . . .’  (126) 
 
The ‘facts’, then, lead to what the judge himself knows is a miscarriage of justice, 
the false imprisonment of Babun. It also leads to the next act in Silindu’s tragedy. 
With Babun in prison, Silindu feels left with only one option to save his daughters 
from the plotting of Fernando and the headman: he kills his two enemies, then 
proceeds to confess his crime. Once more he is brought before the white Hamadoru, 
but this time in a pre-trial examination where his statement is taken down. 
Observing “the hopelessness and suffering in Silindu’s face” (143), the magistrate 
speaks to him in Sinhalese and manages to gain his trust. Finally a meaningful 
conversation occurs in which the truth comes out – how Silindu and Babun had 
been trapped in debt and their livelihood taken away from them by their enemies. 
At last the judge comes to full recognition of the abuse and misappropriation of 
which they are victims and how this hinges on the colonial system, a connection the 
judge articulates for the benefit of the reader. The fact of the murder remains, 
however, and Silindu is sentenced to death by hanging in a higher court. Through 
this story the reader learns how the violent imposition of an irrelevant, misplaced 
and often malfunctioning bureaucratic machinery along with the workings of a 
blind global economy affect the village, destroying its economic foundation but 
equally important the most fundamental of its social mechanisms; the rule of public 
opinion as a safeguard against persecution and scapegoating. The result is 
victimisation, the tragedy of the doubly oppressed, and finally extinction, as the 
village is abandoned and left to the jungle. 
 As Dominic Davies has pointed out, the introduction of the chena system, 
with its conceptions of property alien to rural Ceylonese societies, was a direct 
consequence of Ceylon’s development into a plantation economy governed by the 
networks of colonial capitalism and global trade. Woolf’s novel uncovers the 
ramifications of these global imperial structures at the level of the local community 
and the individual life by depicting the life situation at the margins of an unevenly 
developed governmental apparatus, subject to a systemic corruption that exploits 
the poorest and most peripheral (Davies 2015). The conditions represented in the 
novel recall Lord Cromer’s description of British rule in Egypt as “a hybrid form of 
government to which no name can be given and for which there is no precedent” 
(cited in Arendt 1976: 213).2 For Arendt, Cromer’s term captures “the peculiar state 
form that imperialism inaugurated, specifically the double-sided nature of local 
rule: its combination of contingent and absolute power — of ‘despotism and 
arbitrariness’ — that reflected neither popular will nor the interests of the metropole 
entirely” (Lee 2008, 71). Applied to Woolf’s Village, the trope signifies the ruinous 
presence of the out-of-synch and the out-of-place in a narrative where images of 
modernity and empire coexist with a pre-modern world ruled by superstition, 
fatalism, and tradition, and where modern utilitarian rationality and capitalist 
economy function as ineffectual and violent impositions that rip apart the fabric of 
village life, its cultural institutions, and the rule of public opinion — all of which 
served as safeguards for the individual and the minority against mistreatment by the 
majority. The hybrid society for Woolf is far from the productive “Third Space” 
Homi Bhabha identifies by the concept (Bhabha 38), but nor is it bound up with a 
hierarchical and idealised “purity” of cultures. It is closely linked to Woolf’s ideas 
of how in any society power, economics and ideas evolve in relation to each other, 
determining the social relations of the members of the community to one another 
and to the community as a whole. The Village in the Jungle describes a social order 
that has been violently disrupted by the imposition of elements that are radically out 
of place and out of synch, producing in its stead a hybrid condition beyond law, 
beyond government, where the exploiter is given free reign and where persecution 
and scapegoating are the order of the day. The trope recurs in Woolf’s later writing 
as a conceptual and heuristic tool, not always explicitly named but indexed through 
examples of anachronism and mismatch. Reasoning by comparison and analogy, 
Woolf employs it to conceptualise the historical changes he witnesses during the 
1930s. 
																																																								
2 Lord Cromer was the British Consul General of Egypt in the years 1883–1907. 
I have argued that Woolf’s close observations and detailed knowledge of 
local cultural and economic conditions allowed him to present his analysis of 
structures of oppression in The Village and to inscribe it with the veracity and 
authority of the witness account. Did it matter that the witness in this case was a 
Jew? Yes, in part, because that subject position gave Woolf access to a conceptual 
and representational apparatus that enabled him to frame his observations in a 
transnational perspective that connects the European and the Asian contexts, 
discovering analogies among histories of oppression and racism. As Janice Ho has 
shown in a recent article, Woolf’s representation of and solidarity with the colonial 
other are inseparably bound up with his Jewishness, the awareness of being part of a 
minority population in Britain that was systematically discriminated against. On the 
one hand, Woolf draws on familiar representational practices in European anti-
Semitism, such as racial stereotypes of the hypersexual and degenerate Jewish 
body, in the narrative depictions of the indigenous population (Ho  715). On the 
other hand, he deploys the trope of the unjustly persecuted and suffering Jew in his 
depiction of Silindu, whose double victimisation, at the hands of his fellow villagers 
and through the machinery of colonial law, allows Woolf to interrogate the logic of 
scapegoating as it plays itself out in a community where communal law and public 
opinion have been suspended. The discursive transposition Ho describes does not 
involve or assume a one-to-one relationship between entities, but constitutes a form 
of relational, comparative thinking between languages and cultures. In the novel’s 
textual politics, recognising and representing the other as “the Jew” is not a form of 
erasure of difference; it serves as a form of comparison that establishes analogies 
and global connections between histories of racial oppression, “between domestic 
discrimination and foreign domination” (Ho 719), opening up the possibility of 
reading one story in light of another within a perspective of solidarity and justice. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, Woolf’s preoccupation with 
Jewishness, anti-Semitism and the position of the alien continued and evolved on 
his return from colonial service. In the semi-autobiographical The Wise Virgins, the 
young Jewish protagonist constructs an essentialist identity for himself based on a 
racial logic that seems, as observed by Janice Ho, to be largely produced by 
internalisation of anti-Semitic stereotypes, setting “Jewish corporeality” against 
“Christian ethereality” (Ho 715–16). ) “Three Jews”, by contrast, takes a more 
distant and ironic view. The story was written during World War One, at a time 
when the idea of the foreigner as enemy merged with the idea of the German and 
the Jew (Schröder 314), rendering the already ambiguous status of Jews in early 
twentieth-century Britain increasingly precarious. The story stages questions of 
Jewishness, foreignness, and assimilation through three first person narratives that 
turn on the essence of Jewish identity.  Given the increasing secularization of Jews 
in Britain, the story asks, what remains to bind them together? The immediate 
answer appears to lie in externals: grotesquely exaggerated physical traits, habits of 
dress, patterns of speech — all in a satiric rendition that speaks to anti-Semitic 
stereotypes and Jewish self-hatred alike. Though the three narrators are differently 
placed on the spectrum of assimilation, they immediately recognise each other as 
foreign. The second Jew, himself a catalogue of these external markers, and still a 
religious sceptic, tells the story of the third Jew to demonstrate the continued 
existence of the “old spirit”, which he claims resides in the Jew’s Job-like 
acceptance of suffering. In an ironic twist of the story, however — clear to the 
reader if not to any of the narrators — it emerges that this Jewishness that is 
supposedly “like a rock” is changeable; pragmatically and cynically revised to be 
exchanged for a class-based (hence British) identity. “Three Jews” is clearly written 
by someone who is doubly alien; a story about being a stranger to the British 
majority population but also to any notion of a shared “Jewishness,” whether 
grounded in ethnicity and race or in the historically shared endurance of suffering. 
More than a matter of identity politics, the suffering Jew in the short story; the alien 
with a fractured and tenuous relation to the nation, figures a position that Woolf was 
to return to in other contexts, as when he came to write about anti-Semitism in light 
of Nazi race-hygiene in 1935.  Then it was the Jew as a figure beyond nation and 
delusions of race and blood that occupied him: “The Jew is an appropriate 
scapegoat because they have long ago abandoned tribal and racial delusions,” he 
writes in “A Note on Anti-Semitism” (Woolf 1935: 195).  
Hermione Lee is right in saying that “Three Jews” marked the end of the 
road for the Jewish writer of fiction, though not the end for Woolf as a Jewish 
writer. Through his work in the 1920s and ‘30s, Woolf continued to make use of the 
transposition of discourses and the comparative thinking he had learned as a Jewish 
witness of European colonialism. As I have argued, The Village in the Jungle is 
remarkable as an early attempt to think in transnational terms, pointing out 
analogous contradictions in the project of modernity without reducing singularity 
and difference. What is of particular interest to me in the present enquiry, however, 
are the connections between the comparative operations set in motion by the 
colonial experience and another form of comparison: the cross-temporal and cross-
spatial analogies that inform Woolf’s thinking on totalitarianism — in the form of 
nationalism, xenophobia, racial persecution and absolute power — in the late 
1930s. My point is that for Woolf (as for Arendt) extreme situations — the 
encounter with colonialism and the emergence of totalitarianism — create an urgent 
need for sense making; for the bold and comprehensive narrative that identifies 
causalities and points to a way out of the crisis. Significantly, these are “grand” 
narratives that are produced through radical juxtapositions; a comparative 
methodology that aims for the general and complete rather than the tentative and 
fractured, and that comes with considerable risks. 
 
Imperialism and Totalitarianism: Quack, Quack (1935) and Barbarians at the 
Gate (1939) 
 
An escalating sense of crisis is evident in Woolf’s writing from the 1930s, not least 
in the genres he attempted: a “tract” and a “jeremiad.” In 1939 he even wrote a 
Lehrstück — The Hotel — about the political machinations leading towards war, an 
experiment that indicates the felt urgency of his historiographical and didactic 
project. Quack, Quack and Barbarians at the Gate may be understood as two steps 
in this project, and as different examples of comparison as analytic and didactic 
method. Quack, Quack represents the most problematic form of comparison, where 
the slips critics identify in Arendt’s narrative become most evident. The 
problematic aspect is evident already in the title: this is a tract against what Woolf 
terms quackery; the return in Western culture of unreason, superstition, the claim to 
inspired or absolute truth by the priest or king. In this narrative totalitarianism 
becomes a form of regression within the European space, figured through colonial 
discourse (Frazer) and his memories from Ceylon mediated through a colonial 
imaginary. Woolf is particularly interested in the origins of the modern psychology 
and technology of obedience: how modern mass culture and mass media function in 
the cultural process of regression by producing a hybrid culture of technological 
modernity combined with what he calls “the flag-waving, incantation, medicine-
man frame of mind” (35). In order to account for this hybrid condition, he employs 
a montage of photographs of Hitler and Mussolini juxtaposed with effigies of 
Polynesian war-gods corresponding with Frazer’s descriptions in The Golden 
Bough of inspired leaders (priests or kings) in Polynesia. The point of the 
comparison is to show up the connections between the “political magic” of the 
fascist grand spectacle and the magical inspiration of the war-god. The psychology 
and technology of obedience are the same:  
 
Listen to a speech by one of the Nazi leaders on the wireless or look at a 
photograph of Mussolini or Hitler addressing a meeting of their followers, 
and you will observe that inspiration in Rome or Berlin is the same as in 
Polynesia. The significant point is the psychological effect which the facial 
appearance is meant to produce. They are faces not of individual human 
beings but of the generalized emotions of the savage. Somehow or other the 
fascist leaders have contrived to get their emotions into the same mould. 
(Woolf 1935: 47) 
 
As another example of the modern hybrid condition, Woolf recalls a broadcast of 
the Nuremberg rally in September 1934, when for two or three hours, he listened to 
the transmission of the parade “in which 52,000 labour volunteers goose-stepped 
before Herr Hitler”. The “loud thud of human boots upon the earth”, accompanied 
by “the perpetual beating of a drum,” 
 
carried me back to the everlasting tap of the tom-tom in a jungle village of 
Ceylon. . . . But the most remarkable thing was the voice of the announcer, 
its tones explained everything and showed that there was no question of 
mere interest or entertainment. It was the voice of a man . . . participating in 
a religious ceremony, a ritual dance of his tribe in the primeval jungle before 
his God incarnate in the person of his Chief. (Woolf 1935: 48–49) 
 
What Woolf is recollecting here is the sound of bodies that have ceased to be 
human, metonymically reduced to the instruments of their ruler. From the age of 
mechanical reproduction he is transported back to the tom-tom of the jungle village. 
Strikingly, however, this is a primeval village, not the one he saw as he “tried 
vicariously to live their lives” (Woolf 1964: 47); not the hybrid culture of 
imperialism or the remnants of a tribal democracy he had observed and grasped 
through the lens of fiction. The place to which his memory has transposed him is 
that of a colonial imaginary, the spectacles of the “barely human”, the jungle, the 
rites, and the witchdoctor. The modern technology of obedience has carried him 
back to his own fear and incomprehension, to the ‘I’ of the letters, to the trauma of 
alienation and abjection unfolding itself all over again. 
As I have indicated, however, Woolf’s 1930s writing also constructs a 
narrative that in many respects anticipates that of Arendt in identifying the origins 
of European totalitarian regimes in European racialism and imperialism. The 
prominent text in this historiography, Barbarians at the Gate (1939), styles itself as 
a jeremiad, “the lament for a lost civilization, the denunciation of barbarism” 
(Woolf 1939b, 9-10), in the manner of the Old Testament prototype. For the ancient 
Greeks, the barbarous, or barbarian, was literally one who babbled, who did not 
speak the language of civilised humanity. Woolf’s usage of the term is Marxist, as 
in Rosa Luxembourg’s Junius Brochure (1915), which was the first to raise the 
concern that barbarism was a real possibility. “This world war leads to a reversion 
to barbarism. The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of culture,” writes 
Luxembourg in 1915: “Thus we stand today  . . . before the awful proposition: 
depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery (cited in Spencer 2006, 
529). When Arendt made her attempt to think in a sustained way about barbarism in 
Origins, the term was used to signify the same constellation of elements: world war, 
imperialism, and nationalism (Spencer 2006, 531-32). In his usage, however, 
Woolf, combines Marxist with Freudian ideas, making “barbarian” signify part 
social structure, part individual and group psychology. The barbarian, in this 
narrative, is not the other at the gates; it is the other within. “The control or 
sublimation of instincts is always an essential part of civilization”, writes Woolf, 
with reference to Civilization and its Discontents:  
The immediate satisfaction of the simple and primitive instincts is 
characteristic of those forms of society which are the antithesis of 
civilization and which we may call barbarism. The barbarian is, therefore . . 
. always within. In times of storm and stress his appeal is particularly strong 
(Woolf 1939b, 83).  
 
In Woolf’s Marxist paradigm, “barbarian” designates the master–slave society: the 
society that defines some as less than human and that is ruled on principles of blind 
obedience, fear, and persecution. Constructing a narrative of European culture as 
always already inhabited by the barbarian, he urges the reader to recall historical 
examples of societies that have rested upon and included within themselves large 
populations of “uncivilized beings”, “savage animals — and yet men”: the 
nineteenth-century urban hordes, the medieval serfs, and so on (Woolf 1939b: 85). 
Further, he presents samplings from the cultural archive to unsettle binaries and 
make his point — a historiography of montage and the constellation that involves 
reading Alfred Tennyson’s Victorian war poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade” 
against Pericles’s epitaph for the Athenians killed in battle, as a case of the 
psychology and language of slavery.  
For Woolf, both types of barbarism — psychological and social — were 
given free rein, indeed a new lease of life, with European imperialism. Recounting 
the history of violence, like the atrocities of Denshawai and Congo,3 perpetrated by 
states and individuals in the name of imperialism, he reads jingoism and 
imperialism in Freudian terms as a failure to sublimate primitive instincts; as the 
psychology of persecution founded upon hatred and the inferiority complex. At the 
same time, he takes pains to construct a narrative establishing causalities that 
largely concur with the Marxist view: that economic imperialism, and the 
nationalist and social Darwinist sentiments associated with it, caused World War I 
and the further descent into barbarian behaviour it represented. From this point on, 
however, Woolf’s historiography departs from, or in his own terms attempts to 
correct, the dominant Marxist one. Where the official Marxist narrative of the rise 
of fascism reads it as a stage in the class war, Woolf urges that we supplement the 
Marxist insistence on economic causes with an understanding of the socio-political 
mechanisms that permitted the change in Germany from a civilised to a brutalised 
society. What he wants to understand are the conditions that allowed Hitler to take 
power and that transformed Germany from a civilized into a barbarian nation. He 
does that by analogising different kinds of violent incursion into a social order. 
Strikingly, in this argument, the colony — his recollections of Ceylon as well as the 
analysis of the hybrid community he presents in The Village in the Jungle — 
appears as a heuristic device: a small-scale model that allows him to demonstrate 
the effects of such a violent incursion.  
																																																								
3 For many European contemporaries, the names Denshawai and Congo conjured all the worst 
horrors of colonialism. The first refers to a violent confrontation in 1906 between residents of 
the Egyptian village and British military officers, to which the British responded with harsh 
exemplary measures. Following a summary trial, unusually cruel sentences of public hanging, 
flogging, and hard labour were inflicted, leading to a public outcry at home. The well-
documented atrocities committed under Belgian rule in the Congo Free State were often 
referred to by European contemporaries as the “Congo Horrors.” 
In order to understand the “delusions of the civilized” that has caused the 
rise of fascism, Woolf proposes to take a brief look at the anatomy of a “primitive” 
society. A principle of civilised community, he points out, is that the happiness of 
the individual and of all are mutually dependent. In this sense, tribal society is 
democratic; it may be founded upon superstition and magic, but the rights of the 
individual and his influence upon power are safeguarded by tribal public opinion. 
Imperialism intervened into this balance in indigenous society, destroying tribal 
opinion by imposition of European standards of value, producing a society of 
contradictions ruled by relations of masters and slaves. The hybrid world Woolf 
depicts in Village and again in Barbarians represents a stage in this destruction of 
society:  
 
I have myself watched this phase of individual and social psychology, and 
the dislocation of communal life accompanying it, in remote villages 
scattered through the jungles of Ceylon; no one who has observed it 
carefully could doubt that ideas, unconnected with power and economics, 
can have a profound effect upon the structure and working of a simple 
society. (Woolf 1939b: 114) 
 
For Woolf the use of brute force towards Germany by the allies, evidenced in the 
Versailles Treaty and post-war policies, should be understood as analogous to their 
violent incursions into subject countries, and as key to the change in Germany from 
a civilised to a hybrid and brutalised society. Similarly, he argues, the seizure of 
power by Hitler and the Nazis was initially “just like” the violent incursion of a 
European state into African or Asian territory; “a transaction in direct communal 
power” (Woolf 1939b: 119). The hybrid condition that ensues is evidenced, for 
instance, in the German economic system, which “today is no longer capitalist but a 
hybrid economic system: capitalism and state socialism blended to serve non-
economic objects in a master–slave society” (Woolf 1939b: 137). 
One may object to the empirical gaps and lacunae in Woolf’s argument both 
here and elsewhere. What is more interesting than the ins and outs of the narrative 
is the extent to which it realises a transnational project of cross-temporal and cross-
spatial comparison. As I have shown, the progressively extreme events of the 1930s 
instigated an urgent sense-making project, a search for origins and antecedents, and 
an almost compulsive narrative activity in which comparison was the prominent 
cognitive and heuristic methodology. Comparison took different forms: 
photographic montage aiming to break out of established frames of thought, as well 
as normative, progressivist narratives in which the narrative telos is the society that 
realizes the ideals of Athens and of Marx. With the Freudian interpretive paradigm 
two temporalities are introduced: regression and reversion to savagery on the one 
hand; repetition and the compulsion to repeat on the other. What leads to the 
complications and moments of slippage in Woolf’s narratives is in part that the 
colony appears as a heuristic device in both temporal frames. In the comparative 
operations of Barbarians, if not in the idiosyncratic montage of Quack, Quack, 
there can be little doubt that the comparison with the colony arises from a genuine 
wish to see one situation, one history of violent intervention and repression, in light 
of another. Different from Arendt’s boomerang thesis, Woolf’s story is not so much 
about the de-civilising effects of the colonial enterprise as about the inherent 
barbarism of Western culture; the failure of repression and the compulsion to repeat 
that causes the hybrid master–slave societies of imperialism and Nazi Germany 
alike. In that respect it is an act of memory that locates the rise of “totalitarianism” 
within a global geography that recalls the mutually constitutive relationship 
between Europe and its colonies.  
My turn to the archive in this essay was motivated by a wish to learn more 
about the work of the witness and to bring a historical perspective to bear on current 
critical approaches to comparison as a fundamental cognitive practice with ethical 
as well as heuristic implications. In transnational and global paradigms of thought, 
the desire to release comparison from hierarchical and teleological (progressivist) 
frames has led to the current dominance of the network or other horizontal and 
lateral models, with their often tentative and fractured connections between 
coordinates. As we have seen, however, there are times when the fragmented and 
localised petit récit is not enough. Arendt and Woolf’s grand narratives were both 
composed with the urgency of the witness to extreme events, and both have things 
to teach us about the intellectual and ethical potential as well as the risks of cross-
temporal comparison. What is unique in Woolf’s case, I believe, is the experiential 
grounding of the narrative he was able to compose as he watched the rise in 
nationalism, xenophobia, racial persecution and absolute power in 1930s’ Europe. 
The comparative project he realises in Barbarians at the Gate is enabled by his 
complex and contingent position as a witness to colonial oppression, and, 
significantly, by his processing of this experience through the medium of fiction. 
The dialogic space of the novel, with its accommodation of voices and perspectives, 
its transliteration, translation and transposition of languages, allowed him to arrive 
at a fuller understanding of the trope of the hybrid and to reflect on his own subject 
position within different hierarchies. It set in motion a reflexive and relational 
thinking that turns on analogy and comparison, on similarity and difference; a 
cognitive and ethical practice that forms the basis for future interventions in matters 
of power, ethnicity and race, and especially for his figuration of totalitarianism and 
its colonial origins. 
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